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CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
LABOR LAW IN ILLINOIS: ALICE-IN1
WONDERLAND REVISITED?
Elliott H. Goldstein*
Professor Goldstein points out that Illinois finds itself one of the rapidly
diminishing number of states that have not enacted comprehensive legislation to structure and control collective bargaining in public employment.
In an attempt to correct our inadequate laws, Governor Walker issued
Executive Order No. 6 (1973) entitled "Public Employee Collective Bargaining." Professor Goldstein analyzes the Executive Order, considers
how bargaining impasses are to be resolved, and concludes that the absolute silence of the Order constitutes de facto recognition of public employees' right to strike.
INTRODUCTION

T has become a virtual

lich6 to begin any discussion of the area
of public employee bargaining rights with some amazed reference to the phenomenal growth of both militancy and trade
unionism among public employees since 1950. Indeed, one cannot over-emphasize the crucial importance of the growth in numbers and strength of public employee unionism at a time when
union strength in the private sector has, at best, stagnated. 2 In re* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Lee Elberts, Roslyn Lieb, Henry Revzan and
David Weinberg.
1. In 1969, the current chairman of the National Labor Relations Board,
Edward B. Miller, then a prominent Chicago practitioner, characterized public
sector labor relations in Illinois as "a strange and wonderful world indeed, and as
Alice said, it gets curiouser and curiouser." Miller, The Alice-in-Wonderland World
of Public Employee Bargaining, 50 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 223, 226 (1969). Miller's
article reviewed the obvious discrepancies which existed in 1969 between the textbook conception of reality in public sector law in this state, which Miller called the
"dreamworld of the law," and what Miller called the "real world of the facts."
Id. at 223-224. Governor Walker's EXECUrIVE ORDER No. 6 (1973), discussed infra,
seems to require a new review of collective bargaining among state public employees in Illinois. To this writer, the intervening four years have not changed the
picture appreciably. Public employee bargaining in Illinois is still truly "an Alicein-Wonderland World."
2. See D. Wollett & D. Sears, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT,
pp. IX-XII (1971).
See generally Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain
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sponse, at least thirty states have enacted statutes granting collective
bargaining rights to various categories of public employees.3
However the Illinois General Assembly, despite numerous at-

tempts to enact such legislation, has been able to pass only extremely limited and specialized legislation for specific categories of

public employees. 4 In 1966, a governor's advisory commission,
known as the Kerner Commission, was established to consider all
aspects of employer-employee relations for state and local govern-

mental agencies.

The Kerner Commission in a report issued in

1967 concluded that passage of a public employee labor relations
law was "imperative." 5 Nevertheless the attempt to enact legislain Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885 (1973); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969); Pollelle, Collective Bargaining and the Public
Employee: A Coherence or Chaos?, 48 N. DAK. L. REV. 41 (1971); Project,
Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment-Part I: Historical Summary, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 893 (1972); Shaw & Clark, The Practical Differences
Between Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 867
(1972); Trends and Changes in Union Membership, 89 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 510-13
(1966); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969); Fritchey, Public Employees Turn Militant,
The Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1973, at 18 col. 3.
3. Different approaches are incorporated in HAWAI REV. STAT. tit. 7, §§ 89-1
to 89-20 (Supp. 1972) (public employees); MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 17.455(1)
et seq. (Supp. 1973) (public employees); Taylor Act, N.Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW,
§§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973) (public employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.43, §§
1101.101-1101.2301 (Supp. 1973) (public employees); Ws. STAT. ANN. tit.13,
§§ 111.50-111.64 (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1973) (public utilities
employees);
tit.
13, §§ 111.70-111.77 (Supp. 1973) (municipal employees); tit. 13, §§ 111.80111.97 (Supp. 1973) (state employees). See also D. WOLLETI, supra note 2, at
98-100.
4. In 1945, the state legislature authorized the Chicago Transit Authority to
continue the collective bargaining procedures used when the transit system was held
in private ownership, including voluntarily binding arbitration of a dispute over the
terms of any contract. ILL. REV. STAT. 1112/3, § 328a (1966).
A statute
was passed authorizing the university civil service system to enter into negotiations
on wages and other conditions of employment with employee organizations representing nonacademic employees. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 241/2, §§ 3861-38M (1965).
Legislation dealing with limited bargaining rights for municipal fire fighters was
also enacted in 1951.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 10-3-1 to 10-3-11 (1967).
The STATE PERSONNEL CODE authorizes the State Director of Personnel "to conduct
negotiations affecting pay, hours of work, or other working conditions of employees"
subject to the Code.

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 127, § 63b109(7) (1967).

Legislation

passed in 1961 and 1963 permits state or local employees (where there is an enabling ordinance or resolution) to check off union dues for its employees. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 354 (1967) (state employees); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 472
(1966) (local employees). In 1945, the legislature had in fact passed a bill granting public employees the right to negotiate collectively. The Governor, however,
successfully vetoed this Bill. S.B. 427, 64th I11.
Gen. Assembly (1945).

5.

See,

GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT

POLICY FOR

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:382

tion based on this report foundered on the issue of the right of public
employees to strike.6
In 1971, a second commission, the Ogilvie Commission, stated
that "the passage of legislation is even more imperative now than
it was four years ago." 7 But the enactment of proposed legislation
based on the recommendations of the Ogilvie Commission also met
dismal failure, once again because of the inability of the state legislature to resolve the issue of whether public employees have a right
to strike.8

In the face of this inability of the Illinois General Assembly to
provide such legislation, what has developed is an ad hoc, piecemeal response by the various governmental units confronted with
employees demanding collective bargaining rights and a union contract. Some units of government, such as the Chicago Board of

Education, have "voluntarily" recognized employee unions and
signed collective bargaining agreements with these unions.'

Other

governmental employers have absolutely refused to recognize and
bargain with unions of their employees. Recognitional strikes have
resulted with varying degrees of success. 10 The achievement of
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (March 1967) [hereinafter
cited as the KERNER REPORT].
6. See Clark, Public Employee Labor Legislation: A Study o the Unsuccessful
Attempt to Enact a Public Employee BargainingStatute in Illinois, 20 LAB. L.J. 164
(1969); DERBER, LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN ILLINOIS:
THE EXPERIENCE OF ThE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, 1966-1967, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN GOVERNMENT 204 (1972).

7.

COMMISSION,ON LABOR LAWS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

19-20 (April

1971). [hereinafter cited as the OGILVIE REPORT].
8. See, e.g., S.B. 1000, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973); H.B. 448, 78th Ill.
Gen. Assembly (1973); H.B. 3632, 77th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1971); H.B. 1, 77th
Ill. Gen. Assembly (1971).
9. In Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456,
222 N.E.2d 243 (1966), the Illinois Appellate Court for the First Division held
that in the absence of legislation the Chicago Board of Education had the discretionary authority to recognize a bargaining representative selected by a majority of
its teacher employees. Upon recognition, the court held, the Board of Education
had the discretionary authority to bargain collectively with a union so chosen and
to enter into a written collective bargaining agreement with it. Although an appeal was filed, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to grant it. 35 Ill. 2d 630 (1967).
In Edwards, supra, note 2 at 890, Professor Harry T. Edwards states that this is
the only American decision that has held that a public employer has the authority,
"in a non-proprietary area and absent a statute, to engage in private-sector-type
collective bargaining with an exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit."
10. See, e.g., Cook County Police Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 8 I1. App. 3d 147,
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recognition and bargaining rights by public employees has thus been
exclusively dependent on their extent of organization and their economic power, not on any rule of law.
On the state level, what has at last appeared is a granting of bar-

gaining rights to state employees working directly under the authority of the Governor under the terms of the Illinois Personnel
Code."
The device used to grant these bargaining rights is an
executive order issued by the governor, as presented below.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.

6:

SUBSTANCE AND

ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK

On September 4, 1973, Governor Daniel J. Walker issued Execu-

tive Order No. 6 (1973), entitled "Public Employee Collective Bargaining. '"12 This order grants bargaining rights to all state employees working for departments, agencies, boards and commissions
whose vouchers are subject to approval by the Department of Finance.

Specifically excluded under the order are the supervisors,

managerial employees, confidential, emergency and temporary employees of the covered agencies.'"

Also excluded are all employees

of the state police, and state college and university employees, since
they are not covered by the Illinois Personnel Code.
The order provides that all covered employees "shall have the
right, freely and without fear of threat or reprisal, to voluntarily
form, join and assist an employee organization and the right to re289 N.E.2d 226 (1972) where the court held that in the absence of a statute, a
city had no enforceable duty to recognize a representative of its employees or to
bargain collectively with them about wages, hours or working conditions. Therefore, the appellate court reversed a lower court's issuance of a mandatory injunction
ordering the city to recognize and bargain with an association representing its
policemen. To the same effect, see Chicago High School Assistant Principals
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 5 I11.App. 3d 672, 284 N.E.2d 14 (1972). For an example
of a recent successful recognitional strike, see Chicago Tribune, Oct. 29, 1973 § 1,
at 22, col. 1.
11. ExEcUTiVE OIRR No. 6 (1973) was issued pursuant to § 9(7) of the
ILLINOIS PERSONNEL CODE, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b109(7), which authorizes

the Director of Personnel "[t]o conduct negotiations affecting pay, hours of work,
or other working conditions of employees. . .

(1973).
12. EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 6 (1973)
TIVE ORDER No. 6].

13.

Id., at 2, para. 1.

."

See EXECUTIVE ORDER Nc. 3. 1

[hereinafter cited as the ORDER or EXECU-
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frain from any such activity."' 4 This language virtually mirrors
Section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, the statute which
accords and guarantees to employees in the private sector the right
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining. Like the Labor-Management Relations Act, the Order seeks
to achieve, assure and protect the above rights by prohibiting any
"interference, restraint, coercion or discrimination against employees
in the exercise of their rights" to organize or refrain from joining
unions.15
The Director of Personnel is made primarily responsible for implementing the provisions of the Order and the rights granted in it.
To aid the Director of Personnel, the Order creates a six-member
State Employee Labor Relations Council, "consisting of the State
Labor Director as Chairman, the Director of Personnel, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and three public members
with experience in labor relations to be appointed by the governor."' 16 The Council is a purely advisory body. Its function is to
advise the Personnel Director with respect to all rules and regulations issued pursuant to the Order and to provide "such further
assistance as the Director of Personnel may request."' 7
Under Executive Order No. 6 an independent Office of Collective Bargaining is also established.'
It is this agency which is responsible for the actual administration of the provisions of the Order and any administrative rules and regulations issued by the Director of Personnel "to carry out and promote the policies and
purposes of this Order."' 9 In function, the Office of Collective
Bargaining closely resembles that of the National Labor Relations
Board, the private sector model. Like the National Labor Relations
Board, one major responsibility of the Office is to determine whether
a particular unit of employees is appropriate for collective bargaining.20 In determining the appropriateness of such a unit, the Office
14.

Id., at 2, para. 2.

15.

Id.

The relevant sections of the Labor-Management

§§ 7 and 8(a), 29 U.S.C. 157; 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1970).
16. ExcurVn ORDER No. 6, 4, para. 8 (1973).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2, para. 3.
19. Id. at 4, para. 9.

20.

Id. at 2, para. 4.

Relations Act are
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is to "avoid artificial distinctions between groups of employees
whose functions and community of interests are similar, without regard to the statutory jurisdiction of any agency. '' 21 Another standard to be used in determining whether such an employee unit is
appropriate is whether such unit would "promote the interest of the
State in [employee] bargaining on a state-wide basis."22 Under
the Order, state-wide units are presumptively appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining.2"

The above criteria emphasizing vocational groupings or agencywide or state-wide employee organizations should result in the certification of relatively large collective bargaining units.
The Office of Collective Bargaining is also charged with the responsibility of determining whether a particular union seeking rec-

ognition in an appropriate unit is in fact the choice of the majority
of the employees. 24 Those current employee organizations who
have historically represented certain groups of state employees will
continue under the terms of the Order to represent these groups unless a majority specifically rejects them. For all other employee
units, the sole method whereby recognition and the certified representative status may be ascertained is in a secret ballot election. 5

All unions thus certified are to be accorded exclusive recognition by
2
the employing agency.

6

21. Id.
22. Id. at 2-3, para. 4.
23. Id. The criteria enunciated in paragraph 4 of EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 6 reflects an awareness of the dangers of overly fragmented bargaining units in the public sector. See the KERNER REPORT, supra, note 5, at 19. See also Shaw and Clark,
Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector: Legal and

Practical Problems, 51

ORE.

L. REV. 151 (1971); and Rock, The Appropriate Unit

Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 67 MICH. L. REv.

1001 (1969). Under the terms of the order, professional employees may only be
included in the same collective bargaining unit with non-professional employees
when a majority of the professional employees specifically vote for inclusion in
such a unit, and this combination "is not in conflict with the duties of each group."
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 6, 3, para. 4. This standard approximates Section 9(b)
(1) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1964).
24. EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 6, 3, para. 5 (1973).
25. Id., at 3, para. 5; at 5, para. 10.
26. Id., at 3, para. 5. The principle of exclusive recognition has been a cornerstone of unionism in the private sector. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332 (1944). In the public sector, other devices such as proportional representation
have been tried. The principle of exclusive recognition for the union, who has
proved its majority status, is now accepted in the public as well as private sector.
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The administrative framework created under the Order will obligate certified representatives of employees to sit down at the bargaining table with their management counterparts, the head of the
affected agency and the Director of Personnel.27 The mutual obligation is "to meet at reasonable times and negotiate in good faith
with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. .

.

. [This duty to bargain in good faith] shall not

compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession" 28 by either side. These provisions virtually track
the requirements of the pertinent section of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, Section 8(d).29
Yet the actual scope of negotiations to be allowed the parties under the Order is extremely narrow and limited. First, although bargaining for wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment is allowed, this is so only "so far as may be appropriate
and allowable under applicable laws. .

. ."'

Second, all bargain-

ing is expressly made subject to the "laws regarding the appropriation and expenditures of State funds and the Rules of the Department of Personnel."'" Further, the obligation of the representatives of the State of Illinois to negotiate in good faith specifically
does not extend to the "merit principle and the competitive examination system."3' 2 In addition, the state reserves the right not to
negotiate with respect to "the policies, programs and statutory functions of an agency. '"" The state does not have to negotiate conSee the KERNER REPORT, supra, note 5 at 22; and the OGILVIE REPORT, supra, note
7 at 29-31, and Edwards, supra, note 2 at 901. Cf., the California Winton Act
covering public education which provides for proportional representation of employee groups through "negotiating councils." Cal. Govt. Code §§ 3500-11 (West
1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1972).
27. ExEcurirE ORDER No. 6, 3, para. 6 (1973).
28. Id.

29.

Section 8(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act provides that "to bar-

gain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment,
. . . but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
30. EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 6, 3, para. 6 (1973).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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cerning such topics as "decisions concerning standards, scope and
delivery of service and the utilization of technology" or the state
retirement system and the state life and health insurance program. 4
Finally, Executive Order No. 6 provides a catch-all statement that
the state retains the right not to negotiate concerning "anything re-

quired or prohibited by law." 331
This list of "non-negotiable" topics obviously excludes many subjects which have traditionally been included under the private sector
duty to bargain.3"

However, the scope of bargaining allowed under

Executive Order No. 6 is roughly equivalent to the limitation on the
scope of bargaining imposed by Executive Order No. 10988, the
Kennedy Order, issued in 1962; this Order initially granted public
employees collective bargaining rights at the federal level.3 7 While
the current federal executive order, Executive Order 11491, is much
less restrictive in the scope of bargaining allowed, section 12 thereof
still sharply limits the permissible scope of collective bargaining negotiations.3"
Many of the state statutes dealing with labor relations in the public section contain similar or even more restrictive provisions. 9 In
fact, several state statutes do not impose any mutual obligation on
the parties to negotiate in good faith but merely require the public
employer to "meet and confer" with union representatives before
34. Id. at 4, para. 6.
35. Id.
36. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958);
NLRB v. American Natl. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); and
NLRB v. General Electric Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
965 (1970). See also Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in
American Law, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1941); Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of
Collective Bargaining by the NLRB, 63 HARv. L. REV. 389 (1950); and Gross,
Cullen & Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (1968).
37. EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (Supp. 1964), 5 U.S.C. § 631

(1964).
38. See EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 11491, 3 C.F.R. 262 (Supp. 1973), 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 (1970).
39. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4326(d) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66(1) (Supp. 1973);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:7 (Supp. 1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150(2)(e)
(1971); S.D. COmp. LAws ANN. § 3-18-2 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.3,
§ 905(b) (1972); and Wis. STAT. ANN. tit.13, § 111.91(2)(a) (Supp. 1973).

390
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unilaterally adopting agency policy.40
Provisions creating large categories of "non-negotiable topics"
where management officials of the affected agencies may properly
refuse even to talk about whole areas of employment relations are
thus the rule and not the exception in the public area. Such clauses,
of course, in fact reflect a beginner's fear of participating in fullscale collective bargaining. As bargaining becomes more institutionalized, the allowable scope of bargaining may expand, as it
has done in the federal sector.
Although admittedly limited in scope, the duty to bargain in good
faith requirement of Executive Order No. 6 should result in genuine
collective bargaining: a real give-and-take as to the issues properly
placed on the bargaining table by the parties. Genuine bargaining,
however, means real disputes. These disputes must ultimately result
in an impasse in the bargaining process concerning some issues. In
the private sector, such impasses in bargaining are resolved by threatening the use of the strike weapon by actual strikes or by employer lockouts. These effective mechanisms which are available in
the private sector to unions and management largely define strategies used at the bargaining table and to a great extent determine
the ultimate result. How bargaining impasses are to be resolvedwhat rights are accorded and what mechanisms and machinery are
provided-are the significant questions in analyzing the likely impact of Executive Order No. 6 on the bargaining process for covered state employees. This topic will be dealt with next.
STRIKES AND IMPASSE RESOLUTION UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.

6

In the United States, public employee strikes have been declared
illegal at every level of the government. This absolute prohibition
is the most significant distinction between the public and private
40. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3) (Supp. 1971) (fire fighters); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 13080-90 (West 1969), as amended, (West Supp. 1973) (Winton Act-teachers);
CAL. GOV'T CODE §H 3500-10 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1972) (MeyersMilias-Brown Act-other public employees); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3525-3536 (West
Supp. 1972) (state employees); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1801 to 44-1811 (Supp. 1973)
(fire fighters); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4321 to 75-4335 (Supp. 1972) (public employees); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 105-500-530 (Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 75-6115 to 75-6128 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.440-.480, 342.710-.780
(1971).
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sectors in their respective handling of labor relations problems. The
absolute proscription against strikes by public employees was the
rule until the last half-decade in virtually all jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, the rule was court-made; in others, the strike proscription was specifically enacted by the appropriate legislative body.4'
The logic of the proscription against strikes by public employees
was succinctly stated in the United Federation of Postal Clerks v.
Blount.4 2 In Blount, a three-judge federal court held that there is
no constitutional right for public employees to strike against their
employer. In so holding, the court stated that:
At common law no employee, whether public or private, had a constitutional right to strike in concert with his fellow workers. Indeed, such collective action on the part of employees was often held to be a conspiracy.
When the right of private employees to strike finally received full protection, it was by statute, Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
. . . It seems clear that public employees stand on no stronger footing in
this regard than private employees and that in the absence of a statute,
they too do not possess the right to strike ...
Given the fact that there is no constitutional right to strike, it is not irrational or arbitrary for the Government to condition employment on a
promise not to withhold labor collectively, and to prohibit strikes by
those in public employment, whether because of the prerogatives of the
sovereign, some sense of higher obligation associated with public service,
to assure the continuing functioning of the Government without interrup43
tion, to protect public health and safety or for other reasons.

Similar reasoning buttressed the controlling decision in Illinois,
Board of Educ. v. Redding.4 In Redding, the court stated that:
41. The literature discussing the no-strike prohibition in public employment is
volumnious. See generally Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public
Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 943 (1969); Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in
Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REv. 459 (1971); Burton & Krider, The Role
and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Kheel,
Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969); Shaw & Clark,
Public Sector Strikes: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J. LAw & ED. 217 (1973); Smith,
State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A
Comparative Analysis, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 891, 908-17 (1969); Wellington & Winter,
The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107,
1123 (1969).
Discussions specifically dealing with the no-strike issue in Illinois
are Miller, supra, note 1; Shaw & Clark, The Need for Public Employee Labor
Legislation in Illinois, 59 ILL. BAR J. 628, 644-46 (1971); and Note, Teacher Negotiations In Illinois: Current Status and Proposed Reforms, 1973 ILL. L. FORUM
307, 330-36.
42. 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
43. Id. at 882-83.
44. 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
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The underlying basis for the policy against strikes by public employees is
the sound and demanding notion that governmental functions may not be
impeded or obstructed, as well as the concept that the profit motive, inherent in the principle of free enterprise, is absent in the governmental
45
function.

Like the judiciary, most scholars have had a real aversion to the
possibility of strikes in the public sector. Academic opposition to
even a limited right to strike for public employees is based on three
major concepts: the concept of the sovereignty of the public employer; the concept that strikes in the public sector deprive the body
politic of essential government services necessary to the health and
welfare of the community; and the belief "that strikes in non-essential governmental services should not be permitted because it is administratively infeasible to distinguish among the various govern-

ment services on the basis of their essentiality. '40 Professors Harry
H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., have developed an additional theme to support their opposition to strikes in public employ-

ment. Their argument, really a variant of the sovereignty concept,
is that the application of economic force by employees to the em-

ploying agencies in the public employment sector constitutes a distortion of the American political decision-making process.
Professors Wellington and Winter suggest that:

Thus,

The trouble is that if unions are able to withhold labor-to strike-as
well as to employ the usual methods of political pressure, they may possess a disproportionate share of effective power in the process of decision. Collective bargaining would then be so effective a pressure as to skew
the results of the 'normal' American political process.
The problem is that because market restraints are attenuated and because public employee strikes cause inconvenience to voters, such strikes
too often succeed. Since other interest groups with conflicting claims on
municipal government do not, as a general proposition, have anything approaching the effectiveness of this union technique-or at least cannot
maintain this relative degree of power over the long run-they are put at
a significant competitive disadvantage in the political process. Where this
is the case, it must be said that the political process has been radically
altered . . . . 47

The

1967 Kerner Report reflected in its recommendations

45. Id. at 571-72, 207 N.E.2d at 430.
46. Burton & Krider, supra, note 41, at 418.
47. Wellington & Winter, supra note 41, at 1123-24.
& R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971).

See also H. WELLINGTON
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the then-prevalent attitudes of both the judiciary and the scholarly
community. The report conceded that "[t]he strike issue is central
'
to a discussion of public employee-employer relations. ""
The report then observed that
the Commission also recognizes that significant differences exist between
the services provided by public and by private employers and the stand-

ards used to determine how extensively and at what level of quality these
services are to be performed. In private industry, decisions about these
matters are generally influenced by market forces; in public agencies,
these services are generally supplied 'free of price' and are determined by
political processes in which legislative bodies decide how much revenue can
be raised and how it is to be allocated among many competing demands.
These factors make the determination of employment conditions in public
agencies different from the process followed in private industry.4 9

Based on the above reasoning, one of the five major principles upon
which the Kerner Commission predicated its report is that a strike
is not an appropriate instrument to be used in negotiation in the
public sector and, therefore, "should be unequivocally prohibited."' 5
The suggested alternative dispute-settling machinery set forth in the
Kerner Report were the devices of mediation and fact-finding with
recommendations. 5 1
If one accepts the above-described basic premises, the logic of an
unequivocal proscription against strikes in the public sector has a
certain symmetry and weight. It is perhaps the curse of the pragmatist to believe that rules of law should comport to some degree
not just with theory, but with reality-that a society's institutional
structures, norms and standards should "work": at least in the limited sense that they provide mechanisms which allow people to solve
their work-related problems with some degree of dispatch, certitude
and even ideally with a certain degree of fairness. By this pragmatic standard, it is quite obvious that the unequivocal proscription
of strikes in the public sector has completely failed. Anyone who
reads a newspaper knows public employees do strike, strike often,
and with impunity.
Perhaps these pragmatic considerations influenced the Ogilvie
Commission, in 1971, to disagree with its predecessor, the Kerner
48.

The KERNER REPORT, supra note 5, at 25.

49.

Id. at 1.

50. id. at 2.
51. Id. at 26-32.
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Commission, on the question of the right to strike for public employees. The Ogilvie Commission in its report stated that, "[W]e
have concluded that a limited right to strike be allowed public employees whose continued service at the time is not held vital to public
health, safety, or welfare, provided that impasse procedures have run
their course."5' 2 The impasse procedures recommended by the commission were mediation, with mediators to be supplied by the independent state agency created to administer the statute; a fact-finding
panel appointed by the aforesaid state labor board, for if the compulsory mediation failed to resolve the impasse, the fact-finding
panel would have power to conduct private hearings, take both oral
and written testimony, and be able to subpoena, and to publicize its
findings if necessary; and binding arbitration upon voluntary submission of the parties."' Upon the exhaustion of these prescribed dispute-resolving procedures, the affected public employees would have
the right to strike, "unless or until such a strike creates a clear and
present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the pub'
lic." 54
In such cases the public employer would be required to initiate legal action in the circuit court of the county where such strike
occurred for all appropriate equitable relief including but not limited to an injunction. 5
How does Executive Order No. 6 purport to handle the crucial
right-to-strike issue? By silence. There is absolutely no mention
of the word strike in the entire Order, nor are there any alternative
methods for the resolution of a bargaining impasse set forth. Given
the crucial importance of the right-to-strike issue, the care with
which the proposals for impasse-and dispute-resolving machinery
had been structured in both the Kerner and Ogilvie reports,
and the intensity of the lobbying by both the unions and by
their management counterparts in the Illinois General Assembly
since at least 1967,56 it would be completely ridiculous to believe
that the Executive Order No. 6's absolute silence was unconscious
or a mere draftsman's error. The omission of any provision for im52.
53.

Ture OGILVIE REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
Id. at 37-40.

54.
55.

Id. at 40.
Id.

56. For an excellent discussion of the lobbying that occurred, see Clark, supra
note 6 at 171-72.
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passe resolution was obviously intentional. The intent must be to
leave completely open, at least in theory, the question of whether
state employees may strike to enforce their economic demands. Presumably, it would be argued by the drafters of Executive Order No.
6 that should any employee group in fact engage in a strike or
other concerted activity against a public employer agency, it will be
for the Illinois courts to decide the issue of whether the particular
employees are engaged in a legal or an illegal strike.
It is to be remembered, however, that courts resolve only issues
that interested parties, having standing to sue, choose to litigate.
De facto recognition of the right to strike for employees covered
by Executive Order No. 6 may result from the simple expedient
of an executive decision not to institute legal action in a particular
work stoppage. If the model of lower level governmental units who
have "voluntarily" granted bargaining rights in Illinois is adhered
to, institution of legal action by any of the interested parties who
are involved in a strike would be an exception, not the rule.
Moreover, in Allen v. Maurer,5 7 the Fourth District Appellate
Court of Illinois decided that taxpayer-parents did not have standing
to sue to enjoin a teachers' strike in order to secure performance of
the constitutionally mandated duty of the state of Illinois to maintain a public school system. Rather, the courts specifically held that
in the circumstances present here, the authority to seek an injunction rests
in the State and its official representative, the Board of Education, the
members of which are elected by the people to implement the command
of the constitution. Any other decision would have the effect of usurping
the Board of Education's control of the local educational system. Control

of that system, and the manner in which the constitutional mandate for a
free and efficient system of public instruction is carried out must, of necessity, rest solely with the Board of Education. 5 8

In so holding, the court specifically rejected the argument that the
parents were enforcing a "public trust." 59 The court decided that
the concept of public trust is a theory that is premised upon an
alleged misuse of public property or funds. Where an action is
premised not on any misuse of public funds but on forcing the
state to perform some constitutional duty, Allen holds that taxpayers
57.

6 I11.
App. 3d 633, 286 N.E.2d 135 (1972).

58.

Id. at 640, 286 N.E.2d at 140.

59.

Id. at 639, 286 N.E.2d at 139.
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do not have a standing to sue. In light of that appellate court decision,
only the union and the appropriate governmental agency charged
with providing the struck governmental service would have sufficient
interest to obtain relief in court.
Even if legal action is actually instituted by the affected state
agency, the relevant case law in Illinois may prohibit struck public
agencies from effectively stopping strikes by their employees. The
leading case on point, Board of Education v. Redding, ° seems to
hold just the opposite: that an injunction to prohibit strikes and
any picketing in support of public employee strikes is proper. In
Redding, a school board sought to enjoin its custodial employees
from engaging in a strike against the board and from picketing its
schools in support of such a strike. The trial court denied injunctive relief, and dismissed the board's complaint. The trial court
found that the Board had failed to show irreparable injury and that
the picketing was peaceful and a valid exercise of constitutional
rights of free speech. Further, the lower court held "that there was
no danger of interference with the operations of the schools." 61
The Illinois Supreme Court overturned the lower court ruling, finding that the custodians' strike was clearly illegal and that irreparable
injury had, in fact, occurred. The court then ordered that an injunction be issued to stop the strike and picketing. In so holding
the court stated:
[T]he universal view [is] that there is no inherent right in municipal employees to strike against their governmental employer, whether Federal,
State, or a political subdivision thereof, and that a strike of municipal
employees for any purpose is illegal.

62

The court reasoned further that those who implement the constitution and supporting statutes "become the agents to fulfill the will
of the people in such respect and are themselves charged with a duty
to refrain from conduct which will render our schools less efficient
and thorough."6 3 The duty arises from the Illinois constitution itself, which has imposed a specific and particular duty on the General Assembly to "provide a thorough and efficient system of free
'
schools."64
60.

32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).

61.

Id. at 570-71, 207 N.E.2d at 429.

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 571, 207 N.E.2d at 430.
ld. at 572, 207 N.E.2d at 430.
ld.
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The court rejected the striking custodian's argument that there
was a difference "between striking teachers and striking custodial
employees measured in terms of the constitutional mandate that our
schools be thorough and efficient."65 Further, the court rejected the
striking employee's offer to perform essential sanitary services so as
not to injure the board or interfere with the education of the school
children. To the court, "to be thorough and efficient, school operations cannot depend upon the choice or whim of its employees, or
their union . . . but must necessarily be controlled only by duly

constituted and qualified school officials." 6
As noted above, when first issued, this decision was generally
interpreted as holding that all strikes by public employees are illegal
in Illinois, and that an injunction to prohibit such strikes and any
picketing in support thereof was perfectly proper.
Four years after Redding, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
in Peters v. South Chicago Community Hospital,6" ruled that the

Illinois Anti-Injunction Act, 68 which prevents the issuance of any
restraining order or injunction by any court in Illinois in any case
growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, applied to private, non-profit hospitals so as to prevent the
lower court's enjoining a strike or picketing. In so holding, the
court specifically rejected the hospital's argument that the anti-injunction statute should not apply when the purpose of a strike
clearly violates the general public policy of providing for a community's health and well-being.69 The court reasoned that there must
Id. at 572-73, 207 N.E.2d at 430-3 1.
Id. at 573, 207 N.E.2d at 431.
44 111. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 (1969).
68. ILL. REV.STAT.ch. 48, § 2(a) (1971).
65.
66.
67.

69.

The First District Appellate Court had adopted this point of view in reversing

a trial court's order that an election be held by certain of the hospital employees to
determine whether they wanted a union. That court held that the judiciary "may
not formulate labor rules or policies when the legislature has failed to do so."
92 Ill. App. 2d 37, 45, 235 N.E.2d 842, 846 (1968). The court then remanded.
On a second appeal the appellate court held that striking and picketing of a hospital

by hospital employees was against public policy and enjoinable. The court said:
The question for determination is whether a peaceful strike and picketing directed against a not-for-profit hospital is illegal as being contrary to
public policy. The answer lies in balancing two conflicting principles of
public policy. On one hand is the right of employees to organize and
picket or strike with a view toward obtaining higher wages and better
working conditions.

On the other hand, not-for-profit hospitals provide a

vital service to the community by ministering to the needs of the sick and
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be a much more specific expression of public policy, either by the
state constitution itself or by legislation, to overcome the Illinois
Anti-Injunction Act's prohibition against issuing injunctions in all
labor disputes.
One year later, in County of Peoria v. Benedict,70 the court was
faced with the issue of whether Illinois' anti-injunction law was applicable to striking public employees of a county-owned nursing
home, clearly a public employer but like Peters, also supplying the
health care needs of sick patients. The apparently unequivocal prohibition against strikes by all categories of public employees set forth
in Redding would seem to make the Illinois anti-injunction statute
inapplicable to public employees, therefore allowing the trial court
to enjoin the striking employees' activities. The court held, however, that the Anti-Injunction Act applied, despite the public nature
of the labor dispute before the court. Thus, in County of Peoria,
the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the lower court could not issue
any injunction against the striking employees of the county-owned
nursing home. The court, therefore, dismissed the temporary injunction which had, in fact, been issued against the strike by the
lower court. The court did not buttress its position with any extensive explication of its reasoning. It merely stated "[i]n Peters v.
South Chicago Community Hospital . . . we held the Illinois antiinjunction law applicable to employees of a non-profit hospital. For
the same reasons stated therein, we find the anti-injunction act...
injured, which needs are immediate and should not be interrupted or delayed. The employees involved range from X-ray technicians and physical therapists to janitors and kitchen help, that is, practically all hospital
employees except registered nurses and doctors. We have found no Illinois decision which has considered the issue as it relates to hospitals.
However, the Supreme Court of our State has held that the proper and efficient education of children is an overriding public interest of such importance as to transcend the right of custodial workers to strike or picket a
public school. Board of Education of Community Unit School Dist.
No. 2 v. Redding, 32 I11.
2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427. South health and
life are also important to a community.
The rights of those who labor must be respected, but the operation of
a hospital involves a public interest of such urgency that labor's right to
strike must yield to the greater importance of the uninterrupted and efficient operation of hospitals . ..
107 Il.App. 2d 460 at 465-66, 246 N.E.2d 840 at 843.
70. 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970).
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applicable to the instant case."'' 1
The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, in Allen v. Maurer,72
reaffirmed the illegality of teacher strikes, holding that since there
is a clear "constitutional duty to provide public schools," the implementation of this constitutional mandate is not subject to the
provisions of the Illinois' Anti-Injunction Act. 78 Therefore, paradoxically, Illinois courts may apparently still issue an injunction for
school board employees to stop their strikes or picket actions, but
are apparently unable to enjoin strikes against all other public bodies.
Public strikes are still illegal, if one believes the language of recent
Illinois decisions. 74 However, since the courts cannot enjoin strikes
or picketing in their support, a public employer will be unable to
obtain effective relief-to stop the strike-whenever large numbers
of public employees act in concert against the governmental unit
involved. In the event of a strike the employees cannot all be terminated and replaced simply because of the impracticality of replacing large numbers of skilled employees who perform vital services for the community. It is extremely doubtful that an employing
agency will impose any sanctions whatsoever against striking employees, except in the most extreme cases. If the laws of economics
do not prevent a public employer from firing and attempting to replace substantial numbers of striking state employees, political selfpreservation in an industrial state where unionists comprise a high
percentage of the electorate certainly will do so. Politicians who
fire strikers or otherwise attempt to penalize them will not win
friends or influence voters by these actions.75
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 169-70, 265 N.E.2d at 143.
6 111. App. 3d 633, 286 N.E.2d 135 (1972).
Id. at 644, 286 N.E.2d at 143.
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Fed. of Teachers, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 18

(1970); Board of Education v. Falk, 8 Ill. App. 3d 696, 290 N.E.2d 667 (lst Dist.
1972); Cook County Police Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 8 Ill. App. 3d 147, 289 N.E.
226 (1972); and Fletcher v. Civil Service Comm'n., 6 111. App. 3d 593, 286
N.E.2d 130 (1972).
75. In cases where strikes begin to seriously affect the public health or welfare,

the absolute silence of EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 6 as to the right-to-strike question
may preserve the public employers' options. In these very extreme cases, firm action
against strikers might be a political asset for the executive, rather than a liability.
Therefore, the employing agency might attempt legal action.

Under these circum-

stances, the state could argue that the injunction remedy should be available because
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Under these circumstances, it is submitted that the absolute silence of executive Order No. 6 constitutes de facto recognition of
the right-to-strike for state employees by the executive branch in
Illinois.
CONCLUSION

One authority on public sector labor law in Illinois, R. Theodore
Clark, Jr., as early as 1969 stated:
We are, in short, in a period of substantial transition, a period in which
many traditional notions are being reconsidered in light of new circumstances. Whether public employees, or at least those engaged in non-essential services, will obtain the legal right to strike remains to be seen. I
would suggest, however, that the best way to avoid legalization of strikes
in the public sector is for public employers to devise and be receptive to
imaginative ways of resolving the underlying collective bargaining disputes
76
that are the cause of most public employee strikes.

Such imaginative devices for impasse resolution which would obviate the necessity for the granting of the strike weapon to public
sector employees have obviously not been forthcoming in Illinois.
The Illinois court decisions in this area offer no help; the legislative
response to the problem has been nil. In this context, silence, absolute and total, as to any impasse or resolution devices and/or the
right to strike may be the most intelligent response that the executive
branch could have utilized in issuing Executive Order No. 6.
Viewed from a purely pragmatic point of view this silence does preserve the public employer's options in the face of a strike.
Illinois finds itself one of a rapidly diminishing number of
states that have not enacted comprehensive legislation to structure
and control collective bargaining in public employment. The development of public sector collective bargaining in this state has
been characterized by fragmentation, lack of coherence and ad hoc
responses to particular problems. Executive Order No. 6 adds another institutional structure to already overly-proliferated structures.
This, in turn, increases the likelihood of conflicting rulings and
differing rights and procedures at the various levels of government.
At best, then Executive Order No. 6 is a stop-gap bandage for a
of the specific requirement of the Illinois Constitution that the governor shall
"have the supreme executive power, and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws." ILL. CONsT. Art. V, § 8.
76. Clark, supra note 6, at 173.
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gaping wound in the body politic. A sensible response to the problem would be to adopt the sound recommendations embodied in the
1971 Ogilvie Commission Report, which in turn is modeled after
Pennsylvania's recent public employment labor statute." Such legislation should follow the newly-emerging pattern of granting a limited right to strike to all public sector employees except those whose
work is vital to the public safety and health. It is time the General
Assembly "bit the bullet" and did just that, i.e., enacted such sound
labor legislation for all employees in the public sector throughout
the state.

77.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, ch. 19, §§ 1101.101-1101.2301 (Supp. 1973).

